Here are today’s statistics on the state of the economy:
The MBA says soaring mortgage rates sent applications tumbling -9.8%, with purchases down -3.0% and re-fis down -12.0%.
Existing home sales rose 0.6% in April to a 4.97 Million annual rate, up 9.7% from a year ago.
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Dale Franks
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Hallelujah ... Ben is rock and rollin' !!
http://youtu.be/9u-EbRmyOFA
Mark Dewey
NPR
A new rifle goes on sale on Wednesday, and it's not like any other. It uses lasers and computers to make shooters very accurate. A startup gun company in Texas developed the rifle, which is so effective that some in the shooting community say it should not be sold to the public.
http://youtu.be/UoMAiYnJOBM
It's called the TrackingPoint rifle. On a firing range just outside Austin in
David Post faulted Justice Scalia’s footnote 1 in Monday’s City of Arlington v. FCC (see also this follow-up, so I thought I’d mention my own thought on the subject, because I think there’s actually a useful lesson to law students there.
The footnote, which accompanied a sentence that began, “In July 2008, CTIA—The Wireless Association,” stated:
This is not a typographical error. CTIA—The Wireless Association was the name of the petitioner. CTIA is presumably an (unpronounceable) acronym, but even the organization’s website does not say what it stands for. That secret, known only to wireless-service-provider insiders, we will not disclose here.
And my sense is that the footnote is just a somewhat indirect way to remind lawyers of a useful rule of brief writing — always decode any abbreviations that you use.
Of course, as David points out, it’s not hard for readers to figure out what most abbreviations stand for, with just a bit of research, and the name of the association isn’t that critical in this case in any event. But I take Justice Scalia’s point to be that lawyers shouldn’t put judges to the trouble of doing that research. If you use an abbreviation that your reader is unlikely to know, or for that matter any specialized term that your reader is unlikely to know, make it easy on the reader: define it up front. And don’t just assume that the definition doesn’t matter; the reader of your brief might not share your view. In this case, for instance, a reader might think that understanding what the organization calls itself (especially when it’s a young organization, whose original full name isn’t shrouded in the mists of antiquity) might give him a better picture of the case, and might be annoyed that no decoding was given.
I’m not sure why Justice Scalia thought it necessary to make such a point in this case; maybe he’d seen similar things in other briefs and hadn’t mentioned them then, but this time he thought he ought to say something. But my sense of his point is simply, “Counsel, make things easy on us — if you use a term we don’t know, define it.”
The following section of the book, The Illuminatus! Trilogy, is translated into Deutsch from the English original, written by Robert Shea and Robert Anton Wilson.
FREIER MARKT: Der Zustand der Gesellschaft in dem alle ökonomischen Handlungen (Geschäfte) auf Freiwilligkeit basieren, nicht auf Zwang.
DER STAAT: Die Institution die den freien Markt behindert durch die direkte Anwendung von Zwang oder die Gewährung von Privilegien (unterstützt durch Zwang).
STEUER: Die Form des Zwangs bzw. Behinderung des freien Marktes durch den der Staat Abgaben kassiert (die Steuer), die die Anheuerung von bewaffneten Truppen ermöglichen welche den Zwang ausüben und Privilegien verteidigen, auch die Beteiligung an Kriegen, riskanten Unternehmen, Experimenten, Reformen, etc. wie es ihm beliebt, nicht auf eigene Kosten, sondern auf die Kosten seiner Propanden.
PRIVILEG: Von Latein: privi – privat und lege – recht. Eine Bevorteiligung, die durch den Staat garantiert wird und von seinen Kräften mit Zwang geschützt wird. Ein privates Vorteilsrecht.
ZINSWUCHER: Die Form von Privileg bzw. Einmischung in den freien Markt bei dem staatlich- unterstützte Gruppen das Geldsystem monopolisieren und dadurch Abgaben (Zinsen) einnehmen, direkt oder indirekt, von allen bzw. den meisten ökonomischen Transaktionen.
GROẞGRUNDBESITZ: Die Form von Privileg bzw. Einmischung in den freien Markt bei dem eine staatlich unterstütze Gruppe Land „besitzt“ und dadurch Abgaben (Pacht) von denen einnimmt die dort leben, arbeiten oder produzieren.
ZOLL: Die Form von Privileg bzw. Einmischung in den freien Markt bei Waren die ausserhalb des Staates produziert wurden nicht in gleicher Weise mit den Waren konkurrieren die im Staat produziert wurden.
KAPITALISMUS: Die Gesellschaftsordnung bei der Elemente der Steuer, des Zinswucher, des Großgrundbesitzes und des Zolls eingebettet sind, welche den freien Markt verweigert während sie so tut als würde sie ein Beispiel für diesen sein.
KONSERVATIVISMUS: Die Schule der kapitalistischen Philosophie die behauptet loyal zum freien Markt zu stehen, während sie eigentlich Zinswucher, Großgrundbesitz, Zoll und manchmal Besteuerung unterstützt.
LIBERALISMUS: Die Schule der kapitalistischen Philosophie welche versucht die Ungerechtigkeit des Kapitalismus durch neue Gesetze zu beseitigen. Jederzeit wenn Konservative ein Gesetz erlassen das ein Privileg erschafft, erlassen Liberale ein anderes Gesetz um das Privileg zu modifizieren, dies veranlasst Konservative mehr raffinierte Gesetze zu verabschieden die das Privileg wiederherstellen, usw. solange bis „alles was nicht verboten ist Zwang ist“ und „alles was nicht Zwang ist verboten ist“.
SOZIALISMUS: Die versuchte Abschaffung aller Privilegien durch die Wiederherstellung der vollständigen Zwangsgewalt hinter allen Privilegien, dem Staat, wodurch die kapitalistische Oligarchie in einen staatlichen Monopolismus umgewandelt wird. Eine Wand kalken, indem man sie schwarz streicht.
ANARCHISMUS: Die Ordnung der Gesellschaft in der der freie Markt ungehindert agiert, ohne Steuern, Zinswucher, Großgrundbesitz, Zoll und anderen Formen von Zwang oder Privilegien. „Rechte“ Anarchisten prophezeien das die Menschen in einem freien Markt freiwillig mehr miteinander konkurrieren statt kooperieren würden, „Linke“ Anarchisten prophezeien das es mehr Kooperation als Konkurrenz geben wird.
Robert Shea and Robert Anton Wilson, The Illuminatus! Trilogy (New York: Dell, 1975) pp. 622-23
Die ursprüngliche Version dieses Artikels wurde von Robert Shea und Robert Anton Wilson veröffentlicht.
Übersetzung aus dem Englischen: Sascha Bose
The following article was written by Sheldon Richman and published on his blog The Future of Freedom Foundation, May 22nd, 2013.
Since November, more than a thousand Bangladeshi garment workers have perished in two tragic factory calamities: a fire in Tazreen and a building collapse in Savar, outside the capital, Dhaka. Bangladesh is a major exporter of apparel to the West and “is set to become the world’s largest apparel exporter over the next few years,” the Economist reports. Wages are lower there than most places, including China, and a large percentage of the 4 million garment workers are women.
Are dangerous factories the price of progress? A passionate debate now rages over whether international safety standards should be enforced against manufacturers in the developing world and their Western retailers. Proponents of standards argue that the costs would be small and the benefits great. An Accord on Fire and Building Safety has been signed by major retailers in Europe and a few in North America, but the Huffington Post says that 14 other North American retailers have refused to endorse it. “Some retailers, like Walmart, claim they are working on separate initiatives to improve conditions and workplace safety in Bangladesh,” the online publication states, but this claim has been met with skepticism.
Opponents of government regulation argue that artificially raising the costs of manufacturing in poor countries would harm intended beneficiaries by destroying jobs. If so, workers would face worse options, including life on the streets and prostitution.
Unfortunately, the debate is unnecessarily narrow. What needs discussing — and radical changing — is the country’s political-economic system, which benefits elites while keeping the mass of people down. The economists are correct that under the status quo, imposing safety standards would raise costs, cause unemployment, and aggravate poverty. But we can’t leave the matter there. We must go on to examine how the political-economic system constricts people’s employment opportunities, including self-employment, and otherwise stifles their efforts to improve their lives. Thus, a debate over whether garment factories should be subject to safety regulations, while the status quo goes largely undisturbed, misses the point.
According to a report (PDF) written for the Netherlands ministry of foreign affairs, most Bangladeshis, unsurprisingly, are victimized by a land system that has long benefited the rural and urban elites. “Land-grabbing of both rural and urban land by domestic actors is a problem in Bangladesh,” the report states.
Wealthy and influential people have encroached on public lands…, often with help of officials in land-administration and management departments. Among other examples, hundreds of housing companies in urban areas have started to demarcate their project area using pillars and signboard before receiving titles. They use local musclemen with guns and occupy local administrations, including the police. Most of the time, land owners feel obliged to sell their productive resources to the companies at a price inferior to market value. Civil servants within the government support these companies and receive some plot of land in exchange.
Women suffer most because of the patriarchy supported by the political system. “Women in Bangladesh rarely have equal property rights and rarely hold title to land,” the report notes. “Social and customary practices effectively exclude women from direct access to land.”
As a result,
Many of the rural poor in Bangladesh are landless, have only small plots of land, are depending on tenancy, or sharecropping. Moreover, tenure insecurity is high due to outdated and unfair laws and policies…. These growing rural inequalities and instability also generate migration to towns, increasing the rates of urban poverty.
Urban migration swells the ranks of workers, allowing employers to take advantage of them. Since Bangladesh does not have a free-market economy, starting a business is mired in regulatory red tape that benefits the elite while stifling the chance for poor individuals to find alternatives to factory work. (The owner of the Savar factory, Mohammed Sohel Rana, got rich in a system where, the Guardian writes, “politics and business are closely connected, corruption is rife, and the gap between rich and poor continues to grow.”) Moreover, until the factory collapse, garment workers could not organize without employer permission.
Since Bangladesh does not have a free-market economy, starting a business is mired in regulatory red tape — and worse, such as “intellectual property” law — that benefits the elite while stifling the chance for poor individuals to find alternatives to factory work.
Today Lois Lerner was called to testify before a House Committee about the recent scandal involving the IRS targeting conservative groups for extra scrutiny. Before the Committee, Lerner was invited to make an opening statement. Her opening statement included the following:
On May 14th, the Treasury inspector general released a report finding that the Exempt Organizations field office in Cincinnati, Ohio used inappropriate criteria to identify for further review applications from organizations that planned to engage in political activity, which may mean that they did not qualify for tax exemption.
On that same day, the Department of Justice launched an investigation into the matters described in the inspector general’s report. In addition, members of this committee have accused me of providing false information when I responded to questions about the IRS processing of applications for tax exemption.
I have not done anything wrong. I have not broken any laws. I have not violated any IRS rules or regulations, and I have not provided false information to this or any other congressional committee.
And while I would very much like to answer the committee’s questions today, I’ve been advised by my counselto assert my Constitutional right not to testify or answer questions related to the subject matter of this hearing.
After very careful consideration, I’ve decided to follow my counsel’s advice, and not testify or answer any of the questions today.
Because I’m asserting my right not to testify, I know that some people will assume that I’ve done something wrong. I have not.
Under questioning, Lerner then authenticated answers she gave I.G. investigators about what had happened during the investigation. But she refused to make additional statements.
The Chairman of the committee, Darrell Issa, has argued that Lerner’s statement and her authentication of her earlier statements waived her Fifth Amendment right and that he can call her to testify again without Fifth Amendment protection. A lot of people are wondering, is Issa right? Did Lerner waive her rights so she could not then assert them?
I don’t think the answer is clear, as there are no cases quite like it. The general rule is that a witness can’t testify about her version of the facts and then invoke the Fifth Amendment when facing cross examination. Here’s what the Court said in Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 321(1999):
It is well established that a witness, in a single proceeding, may not testify voluntarily about a subject and then invoke the privilege against self-incrimination when questioned about the details. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951). The privilege is waived for the matters to which the witness testifies, and the scope of the “waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination,” Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154—155 (1958). “The witness himself, certainly if he is a party, determines the area of disclosure and therefore of inquiry,” id., at 155. Nice questions will arise, of course, about the extent of the initial testimony and whether the ensuing questions are comprehended within its scope, but for now it suffices to note the general rule.
The tricky part is how to characterize Lerner’s testimony before she invoked the Fifth Amendment. On one hand, if you say that Lerner merely expressed her view that she is innocent but did not actually testify as to any facts, then you could say she did not waive her rights with her statement. Questioning would not be about the details of facts she already testified to, but rather would require her testimony on a subject she declined to testify about. On the other hand, if you say that Lerner’s expression of innocence is effectively testifying as to her following the law on the subject of the hearing, then you could say that she did testify and did waive her rights. From that perspective, she already testified about “the subject” by saying that she did not violate any IRS rules or submit false testimony, and further questioning would be about the details of why she thinks that.
I’m not enough of a Fifth Amendment nerd to have strong views on which side is right. So I posed the question earlier today to a listserv of criminal procedure professors that includes some serious Fifth Amendment experts. Opinions were somewhat mixed, but I think it’s fair to say that the bulk of responders thought that Lerner had not actually testified because she gave no statements about the facts of what happened. If that view is right, Lerner successfully invoked her Fifth Amendment rights and cannot be called again. But this was not a unanimous view, and there are no cases that seem to be directly on point. So it’s at least a somewhat open question.
UPDATE: I have updated the post to include more from the transcript of the hearing.
The following article is translated into Portuguese from the English original, written by Kevin Carson.
De todos os comentários pretensamente libertários que tentam colocar a tragédia das confecções de peças de vestuário de Bangladesh em “perspectiva,” o de Benjamin Powell é provavelmente o pior (“Sweatshops Em Bangladesh Melhoram A Vida De Seus Trabalhadores, E Estimulam Crescimento,” Forbes, 2 de maio). Em Bangladesh, escreve Powell,
“cerca de 4.500 confecções empregam aproximadamente 4 milhões de trabalhadores. Levando-se em consideração todos os aspectos, eles ficam em melhor situação com as confecções do que ficariam sem elas; os benefícios superam os riscos. Na verdade, em comparação com outras oportunidades em Bangladesh, a indústria de peças de vestuário paga razoavelmente bem.”
Se empresas dos Estados Unidos como a Nike reduzissem sua presença em Bangladesh e abandonassem confecções lá por temor de má publicidade, “centenas de milhares de trabalhadores em peças de vestuário poderiam perder seus empregos e ser lançados em alternativas piores.”
Bem, é mesmo — sob certo aspecto. Quando um assaltante diz “seu dinheiro ou sua vida,” fico em melhor situação entregando o dinheiro e permanecendo vivo — mas foi o sujeito com a arma de fogo que estabeleceu artificialmente o leque de alternativas. A pergunta que você se deveria fazer, e que pessoas como Powell e o pessoal de nível de chefia da Nike não querem que você faça, é: quem decide quais outras alternativas estão disponíveis em Bangladesh?
Não se passa que algum fato da natureza, sem face, inevitável, seja forçado sobre as sweatshops — ou sobre a Nike — por algum mercado anônimo. Graças à marca registrada e à lei de patentes internacionais, a Nike e umas poucas outras empresas são as únicas opções disponíveis quando se trata de empregar pessoas para fazer sapatos. Elas podem aceitar o preço da Nike ou rejeitá-lo. Há porém muitas sweatshops competindo umas com as outras, e a Nike pode facilmente fazer negócio com outras delas. O poder oligopsônico de preços da Nike significa que a empresa pode estabelecer o preço que paga a uma sweatshop por um par de tênis tão baixo quanto desejar. E a mesma “propriedade intelectual” dá a ela poder de preço de oligopólio nos Estados Unidos para vender os tênis com preço de varejo milhares de por cento acima do custo real de produção. A margem entre o que ela paga às sweatshops pelos sapatos e o quanto ela extorque dos consumidores ocidentais não é estabelecida pelo “mercado.” É estabelecida pela Nike. Ela pode estabelecer essa margem tão alto ou tão baixo quanto desejar.
E a expressão decisiva aqui é “tão alto.” A Nike preferirá maximizar a margem que ganha em seus tênis, mesmo à custa de pessoas que residem em habitações locupletadas e trabalham centenas de horas por semana por poucos dólares por dia — e por vezes têm morte lenta e horrível às centenas nos escombros de suas confecções.
A chamada “propriedade intelectual” não é propriedade legítima, e sim monopólio imposto pelo estado, exatamente tão protecionista quanto as tarifas industriais de há um século. Do mesmo modo que a tarifa, a “propriedade intelectual” cria escassez artificial em bens que não são escassos por natureza, permitindo que corporações privilegiadas extraiam rentismo dessa escassez. As corporações globais do século 21 são tão dependentes da “propriedade intelectual” para seus lucros quanto as antigas corporações industriais nacionais do início do século 20 o eram das tarifas. As tarifas pararam de ser úteis à grande empresa, e a “propriedade intelectual” tornou-se útil, porque as corporações se tornaram globais. Pelo fato de o “comércio internacional” em realidade consistir em sua maior parte de transferência interna de bens entre subsidiárias locais de corporações globais, as tarifas não mais servem aos interesses das corporações gigantes. Do mesmo modo que a tarifa, a “propriedade intelectual” é uma restrição governamental acerca de quem tem licença para vender dado tipo de bem em dado mercado, permitindo ao beneficiário cobrar o que quer que os consumidores possam pagar. Diferentemente da tarifa, contudo, que era uma forma de protecionismo que regulava a transferência de bens através de fronteiras nacionais, a “propriedade intelectual” regula a transferência de bens através de fronteiras corporativas.
Diferentemente das corporações industriais de há cem anos, empresas como a Nike na verdade não fazem coisas. Elas usam direitos artificiais de propriedade tais como a “propriedade intelectual” para controlar as condições sob as quais outras pessoas podem fazer coisas, e para criar postos de pedágio entre as pessoas que fazem as coisas e as pessoas que consomem as coisas. O dinheiro realmente, realmente grande não está na capacidade de produzir, e sim na capacidade de coletar tributo para permitir que a produção aconteça.
Sem a “propriedade intelectual,” aquelas confecções em Bangladesh poderiam ignorar a marca registrada Nike e comerciar calçados idênticos com a população local por minúscula fração do preço. E sem a Nike para impor preços uniformes em toda a indústria, elas teriam de competir por trabalhadores locais. Não haveria problema nenhum se a Nike resolvesse “diminuir sua presença” e sair de Bangladesh. O meio de vida dos trabalhadores não mais seria mantido refém do que a Nike fizesse ou deixasse de fazer.
Artigo original afixado por Kevin Carson em 20 de maio de 2013.
Traduzido do inglês por Murilo Otávio Rodrigues Paes Leme.
